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The Austrian Empire and the Italian Question
Italian “Carbonari”1 represented a highly branched secret organiza-
tion striving first to overthrow the French occupation of Italy at the
1 There is a considerable number of studies and monographs dealing with Car-
bonari and their struggle for Italian independence and against the Austrian
supremacy. See for instance G. BERTI – F. della PERUTA (eds.), La nascita della
nazione. La Carboneria. Intrecci veneti, nazionali e internazionali, Rovigo 2002; R.U.
MONTINI – A. ZANIBONI, I processi Spielberghianni. I fogli matricolari dello Spiel-
berg, Roma 1937; A. ZORZI, Österreichs Venedig. Das letzte Kapitel der Fremdherr-
schaft 1798–1866, Düsseldorf 1990; D. LAVEN, Venice and Venetia under the Habs-
burgs (1815–1835), Oxford 2002; F. PESENDORFER, Eiserne Krone und Doppelad-
ler. Lombardo – Venetien 1814–1866, Wien 1992, pp. 160–161; D. UHLÍRˇ, Moravská
epizoda v deˇjinách italské karbonerie, in: Nový Mars Moravicus, Brno 1999, pp.
366–367; H. REINALTER, Der Geheimbund der Carbonari, in: K. BRANDSTAT-
TER – J. HORMANN (eds.), Tirol – Österreich – Italien, Innsbruck 2005, pp. 571–
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turn of the 18th and 19th century. In the beginning, they were not cen-
trally organized and existed in different branches. Like freemasons,
Carbonari surrounded themselves with mysterious rituals, using the
charcoal burner symbolic, as their name refers to. As opposed to the
apolitical and cosmopolitical goals of freemasonry, however, Carbonari
had pursued the unification and independence of Italy. First Carbonari
lodges were created in the southern Italy, from where they had ex-
panded to the north and crystallized into specific local forms, as for
instance the “guelfi” in the Papal state, “adelfi” or “filadelfi” in Pied-
mont or “federati lombardi” in Lombardy.
Despite Lombardy and Venetia had been affiliated with the Habs-
burg monarchy after the Congress of Vienna 1814/15, Carbonari were
resuming their activities in order to shake off the foreign yoke and join
all the Italian states together. Thus they had become a national chal-
lenge to the multinational Habsburg Empire and the greatest threat to
its security and predominance in the Apennine peninsula.
Being conquered and occupied since 1813, Venetia “had” to be in-
corporated into Austrian Empire after 1815 as compensation for lost
Belgium, for revenues and security to the south as well as for general
Austrian leadership in Italy. Moreover, it was a territory rounding off
Austria and connecting it with Illyria and Dalmatia. Lombardy, how-
ever, was acquired by Habsburg monarchy rather for strategic than
territorial or economic reasons, especially aimed to keep France out
of Italy. There were several groupings struggling for power and in-
fluence in Lombardy already by 1815, reaching from the vice-king Eu-
gène de Beauharnais, pro-French party, the so-called “pure” Italians,
i. e. the Piedmontese expansionists favoring old Savoyard expansion-
ist ambitions in Lombardy, Napoleon’s general and king of Naples
JoachimMurat or even foreign outsider like the British general William
572; E. LENNHOFF, Tajné politické spolecˇnosti, Praha 1932, pp. 111–112, 131–132; G.
SCHUSTER,Die geheimen Gesellschaften, Verbindungen und Orden, Wiesbaden 1997,
Vol. 2, pp. 402–403; M. CHVOJKA, Josef Graf Sedlnitzky als Präsident der Polizei- und
Zensurhofstelle in Wien (1817–1848). Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Staatspolizei in der
Habsburgermonarchie, Frankfurt am Main u. a. 2010, pp. 41–70, etc.
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Cavendish-Bentinck. As Paul Schroeder put it, the Austrian acquisi-
tion of Lombardy-Venetia was mainly designed “to promote the balance
of power and make Austria secure”, as much from revolution and conspir-
atorial secret societies as from war.2 Despite the obvious conciliation
tendency of the Austrian military and civil authorities towards public
opinion in Lombardy and Venetia, its rule proved inefficient and slow
and disgruntled liberals, army officers and former officials. There are
several political and economic reasons for this phenomenon. First of
all, the new Italian parts of Habsburg monarchy had to be governed
like other provinces of Francis’s centralized patrimonial empire. Thus,
all of the administration, justice and military offices were instructed
rather from remote capital Vienna than from Milan or Venice. Fur-
thermore, the Austrian Emperor Francis I dropped both the idea of
being crowned a King of Lombardy and of introducing Italian self-
government, while substantially limiting the competences of permit-
ted central and provincial congregations. Last phases of Napoleonic
Wars, military rule, Habsburg taxation and post-war economic distress
had not helped Austrians to win Italian minds as well.3 More uncom-
promisingly, the Habsburg political authorities sought to “extinguish
the spirit of Italian unity and ideas about constitution next to killing Italian
Jacobinism”.4
For this particular reason, the newly established Austrian authori-
ties in Lombardy and Venetia introduced an assessment and classifica-
tion policy with respect to political attitudes and activities of all offi-
cials and clerks regardless of rank or position. Numerous lists of vari-
ous Italian officials being characterized as “suspect”, “bad”, “untrust-
worthy” or even “abhorrent to the public” flowed to Vienna in order to
identify and remove prospective opponents of the new regime among
them. Having applied a typical Austrian/German preciseness, there
2 P.W. SCHROEDER, The Transformation of European Politics in 1763–1848, Oxford
1994, pp. 564–570, quotation p. 570.
3 Ibidem, pp. 565–566; H. RUMPLER, Österreichische Geschichte 1804–1914. Eine
Chance für Mitteleuropa, Vienna u. a. 1997, pp. 162–164.
4 D. BEALES, The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy, London u. a. 1981, p. 41.
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were elaborated descriptions of governmental, provincial and munic-
ipal administration or judicial officials in Lombardy-Venetia, like the
so-called “congregazioni provinciali”, those entitled to sit at the coun-
cilor table, working for the department and city of Venice, prefecture
of Verona and elsewhere, criminal and civil court houses in Padova or
Udine and last but not least, Lombard financial intendants or members
of Procurator General’s office.5
The chief of police6 in Venice, von Raab was ordered to collect as
much information as possible about each and every “former”7 Aus-
trian official in Venetia. He reported in June 1814 that it was impossible
to obtain information about so many office clerks, medical supervisors
or prison guards, because they had been hardly known in the public.
As far as their way of thinking is concerned, however, Raab went on,
“we can assume as true that they were all devoted to the former government,
what they probably cannot be resented for. Initially, since the Austrian occu-
pation, these officials have maintained passive attitudes; many went off with
the enemy troops. Because they are currently anticipating the fate of the Ital-
ian provinces has been decided, they have been approaching the government
5 Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Wien (thereafter HHStA), Kabinettsarchiv (thereaf-
ter KA), Vertrauliche Akten (thereafter VA), box 50, ff. 63, 65–67 (Verzeichnis ei-
niger übel beschriebener Mailänder Beamten), f. 101 (Verzeichnis der in Ferrara
angestellten des Vertrauens nicht würdigen Beamten), f. 117 (Verzeichnis der vom
Polizeidirektor Raab als verdächtig angegebenen öffentlichen Beamten in Trevi-
so); box 51, ff. 64–74 (Die charakteristischen Auskünfte über die Finanzintenden-
ten der Lombardie), ff. 109–122 (Charakteristik aller italienischen Beamten, die
als zum Ratstisch gehörig angesehen werden können), ff. 142–143 (Charakteristik
der in der Lombardie angestellten Prefekten und deren Stellvertreter), ff. 253–260
(Charakter-Schilderung der Mitglieder der Regenz in Mailand), ff. 265–268 (Ver-
zeichnis der bei demKriminal- und Zivilgerichte zu Udine angestellten Beamten),
ff. 314–321 (Charakteristik der bei dem Zivil- und Kriminaltribunal in Venedig
entlassenen Richter), etc.
6 The so-called “general police director” (General-Polizeidirektor).
7 So that such officials are meant who served in Venice and Venetia during the first
Austrian occupation between 1797–1805/6. Thereafter, Venetia had become a part
of Napoleonic Italian Kingdom (until 1814).
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and seeking to win its confidence through hard work and usefulness”.8 The
Venetian chief of police was well aware of the fact that it was “very dif-
ficult to assess public opinion on a public official. Experience has shown that
often those officials were in bad calls, because they have fulfilled their obliga-
tions with rigor and without indulgence; consequently, the most useful, clever
and reliable officials fall into disrepute and are accused of Freemasonry and of
loyalty to the French system in the public”.9 Nevertheless, it emphasizes a
general principle that police excluded, controlled and considered peo-
ple dangerous “because of their freedom, their evil heart, and (. . . ) their
Masonic principles”.10 One had even prepared a list of those persons,
deportation of which was supposed to take place in Lombardy and
Venetia in case of the advance of the enemy.11 Accordingly, persons
like former Capitano provinciale in Venice, Guido Crizzo, renowned
lawyers and freemasons Pietro and Francesco Comaralo or the presi-
dent of Academy of Fine Arts in Venice, cavaliere Zicognara, next to
several others from Treviso or Vicenza as well as from departments
Adige and Friuli should be expelled from Italy.12 Such lists and char-
acteristics might have served as a simple notification, after Napoleon
had been banned to the island of Saint Helena, the warfare finished
in the Apennine peninsula and the Congress of Vienna had restored a
long-expected peace in Europe. It points out clearly, however, that the
transition from French to Austrian rule in Italy had still not been con-
sidered a completed issue. Quite to the contrary, the Austrian political
and police authorities had to keep a watchful eye on Lombardy and
Venetia in order to preserve the newly-made status quo.
8 HHStA, KA, VA, box 50/II, report of Raab from Padova, June 5, 1814.
9 Ibidem.
10 HHStA, KA, VA, box 51, ff. 173–177, Raab to Goess, Venice, September 11, 1815.
Count Julius Strassoldo, the Governor of Lombardy, set up so-called authentic lists
of Freemasons in order to prevent them from maintaining/gaining positions in
the administration. See HHStA, KA, VA, box 51, ff. 52–63, report from Strassoldo,
Milan, November 17, 1815.
11 HHStA, KA, VA, box 51, f. 172, Goess to Hager, Venice, October 1, 1815.
12 HHStA, KA, VA, box 51, ff. 173–177, Raab to Goess, Venice, September 11, 1815.
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Institutional and Secret Tools of Supervision
In his book about Dictatorship and Political Police, the British histo-
rian and sociologist Ernest K. Bramstedt has suggested that one can
compare the activities of the political police against the “enemies of the
state” with a classical three-act-drama. In the first part, the enemies
are being spotted, their plots and organizations discovered. Conse-
quently, the police are chasing and catching them and in the final act,
their punishment and repression is going to take place.13 I’d like to
follow this line of identification, investigation and repression of Car-
bonari by newly established Austrian laws and institutions in the fol-
lowing part. Therefore, I divided it into two sections. In the first one,
we will be looking at the period between the Congress of Vienna and
major Carbonari trials, subdivided further into three phases: (a) final
establishment of Austrian surveillance in 1815–1816, (b) first Carbonari
challenges and the question of Austro-Roman collaboration between
1817–1819 and (c) the years between Carbonari-revolutions and Aus-
trian show trials (1820–1823). In the second part, I will add several
selected generalizing remarks – based on particular source analysis –
about the imprisonment of Carbonari at Spielberg in Brünn, the capital
of the former Habsburg province Moravia-Silesia, between 1822 and
1835.
First, let us have a brief look at the institutional and secret tools of
supervision and administration in Lombardo-Venetia.14 New political
and police institutions were organized in what came to be called the
“Kingdom of Lombardy and Venetia” in order to centralize surveil-
13 E.K. BRAMSTEDT,Dictatorship and Political Police. The Technique of Control by Fear,
London 1945, p. 23.
14 This general part about establishing the Austrian police system in northern Italy
is also based on my previous research in the archives of Vienna and on following
studies: M. CHVOJKA, Zápas habsburskej polície s tajným hnutím talianskych
karbonárov po Viedenskom kongrese, in: Historický cˇasopis 56, 2, 2008, pp. 223–
248 and M. CHVOJKA, “Vigilandum Est Semper, Multae Insidiae Sunt Bonis”
or Permanent Police Surveillance in the Pre-March Habsburg Monarchy, in: Nové
historické rozhl’ady – New Historical Perspectives 1, 1, 2011, pp. 45–48.
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lance in Italian territories of Habsburg monarchy. In respective capi-
tals, Milan and Venice, so-called General police directorates (General-
Polizeidirektionen) were established in 1815/16 and their principal
task was to trace and to eliminate the activity of secret societies. New
Austrian police authorities in northern Italy, subordinated to the chief
of the Police and Censorship Court Office in Vienna, Count Joseph
Sedlnitzky and encouraged by Habsburg Foreign Minister Prince Met-
ternich, were seeking already since May 1815 to organize the “post
lodges”15 as an “important vehicle” of surveillance in Italy. These insti-
tutions were created in Milan in 1815 and in Mantova two years later,
while the Austrian attempts to establish them in the Duchy of Tus-
cany had been either significantly delayed (Livorno, 1838) or its sphere
of influence apparently limited (Florence, because of postal treaty be-
tween Tuscany and Piedmont-Sardinia). In addition, Napoleonic gen-
darmerie in Lombardy, established since 1797 in the wake of peace
congress at Campoformio, had been included into the Austrian control
system after 1815, being subordinated to military authorities in Lom-
bardy and Vienna. This paramilitary security force had to submit its
reports both to military and police offices and accounted for state po-
lice affairs to central police office in Vienna.16
In the second half of 1816, Metternich and Sedlnitzky had launched
a political espionage by sending three agents, Chevalier Dumont, Cap-
tain Frizzi and justice official Pietro Dolce to the Apennine peninsula
(especially to Sardinia, Parma, Modena, Tuscany and Rome) and south-
ern France. These agents were charged to collect information about the
folk mood (“Volksstimmung”) in different Italian states, to recruit se-
cret correspondents there and finally to trace secret societies, their ten-
dency, branches and members. These agents had also recruited secret
15 Also called “black cabinets”, i. e. institutions within the usual post office provid-
ing letter censorship by officials specially educated for this regard (opening up the
letters, writing down the content or its parts if interesting and closing and sealing
the letters again in order to be delivered to its recipient).
16 H. GEBHARDT, Die Gendarmerie in der Steiermark von 1850 bis heute, Graz u. a.
1997, pp. 22–24.
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correspondents in Genoa, Livorno, Reggio, Bologna, Rome, Ancona
and Ferrara.17 This basic Austrian network for surveillance of secret
societies was supplementing the role of the Habsburg consuls and am-
bassadors in capitals of bigger Italian states, especially to Rome, Naples
or Turin. They were obliged to organize a local network of spies and
informants in order to provide Austrian state police authorities in Vi-
enna with confidential messages about political situation of the place.
There is a good example concerning one of the most influential Car-
bonari leaders, Count Federico Confalonieri, with respect both to func-
tioning and limitations of this control system. Being perceived as an
engaged and renowned supporter of Italian independence since 1814,
Confalonieri ought to have been closely supervised during his journey
to Naples and Sicily in June 1816.18 Therefore, the General police direc-
tor inMilan, Count Saurau, introduced a two-way scrutiny of this “sus-
picious traveler”. In the first place, a secret agent was employed for this
particular reason, with an obligation to report directly toMilan. Conse-
quently, the Austrian ambassador in Naples, Prince Jablonowsky, was
asked to pay his attention to Confalonieri. Most interestingly, as we
infer from agent’s report, Jablonowsky completely failed in doing his
job, for he “fell in love with the beautiful Countess Confalonieri and made her
exclusive companion”.19 In this case, a bottom-up control proved to be
17 CHVOJKA, Zápas habsburskej polície, pp. 226–229; CHVOJKA, Vigilandum Est
Semper, pp. 45–46.
18 In 1814, Confalonieri led a Milanese delegation urging the Austrian Emperor
Francis I to expand Lombardy at the expense of Piedmont and the Papal state
and to proclaim an autonomous Kingdom of Italy there under an Austrian arch-
duke. See SCHROEDER, p. 566 and RUMPLER, p. 163. For the perception of
Confalonieri, see Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv Wien (thereafter AVA), Polizei-
hofstelle (thereafter PHS), box 763, No. 1264 ex 1817, Sedlnitzky to Saurau, Vi-
enna, May 13, 1815 and Saurau to Sedlnitzky, Milan, April 24 and May 31, 1817.
19 The Austrian spy also suggested that there were some positive aspects of
Jablonowsky’s failure. His lively devotion for Countess Confalonieri could have
had a soothing effect on the Neapolitan government, because “the malcontents gen-
erally believed Count Confalonieri was being used by the prince Jablonovsky for the sake
of exploring the mood and feelings of others. The passion for his wife should serve only to
mask this intention”. This reputation was supposed to go ahead of Confalonieri to
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more efficient than a top-down surveillance. In any way, this approach
represents the general principle of the Austrian surveillance in Italy, as
described by Count Saurau: “In order to achieve a correct and safe man-
agement of one part of Italy and to assess its political situation and the mood
of the people, it is necessary to observe both the whole peninsula and contacts
between the malcontents there.”20
Despite of the framework, I have already mentioned, the guardians
of the Austrian “peace, order and security” possessed a rather per-
plexed image of Carbonari, including more or less difference between
hypothesis and reality. The most obvious discrepancy can be seen in
the fact that there was a certainty of intense activities of secret societies
in Italy, but also a growing confusion concerning their hierarchy, mem-
bers or sphere of influence. So-called “Congregazione cattolica apos-
tolica romana” was a first particular group in Piedmont and Lombardy
to attract the working attention of the Habsburg police in June 1816. In
September 1816, this association was claimed to be identical with the
secret society of “Philadelphi”, but there was uncertainty of its affili-
ation with Carbonari. Three months later, the aim of Carbonari was
supposed to be the establishment of Italian republic, while Freemasons
were seen as striving for independent Italian kingdom. Moreover, there
were uncertain reports about the existence of so-called “Guelfi” and
“Concistoriali” allegedly looking for members among the clergy and
“upper class malcontents”. Such information could not but persuade
the Austrian political and police authorities that there was a strong na-
tional independentist movement in different parts of Italy divided gen-
erally between the royalists, “papists” and republicans.21
Sicily, and as the latter had arrived there, he should have been generally avoided
by the constitutionalists, because they took him for a secret spy of Austria. See
AVA, PHS, box 763, No. 1264 ex 1817, Saurau to Sedlnitzky, Milan, April 23, 1817.
20 Ibidem.
21 See CHVOJKA, Zápas habsburskej polície, pp. 226–228.
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First Carbonari Challenges and the Question of Austro-
Roman Collaboration
Whereas Sicily-Naples, Papal state or Piedmont-Sardinia seemed to be
bubbling over with secret societies at the turn of 1816/17, Lombardy
and Venetia looked as an island in the tempestuous sea. This persua-
sion of Foreign minister Prince Metternich and chief of Austrian police
Count Sedlnitzky, however, equaled a self-deception that was going
to be broken already in February 1817. The discovery of Carbonari-
lodge in Ascoli in the Papal province Marches and the escape of its
leader, Count Francesco Merli, to Milan revealing his connections to
Lombardy, set the Austrian police to feverish work. As a result, three
members22 of the discovered lodge entitled “Congregazione cattolica
apostolica romana” had been arrested and a series of house searches
and correspondence controls launched in Milan. As the last measures
didn’t manage to provide enough evidence to convict three arrested
Carbonari of crimes against the state, a closer collaboration and infor-
mation exchange with Rome proved to be absolutely indispensable.23
There were, however, more tasks to solve. First and foremost, the
relationship between Carbonari and Guelfi was to be cleared, since
the latter were said to have established their headquarters in Milan in
June 1817. Gradually, both Austrian and Roman police provided each
other with confidential reports and the confusion of the Austrian for-
eign minister and chief of police with respect to Carbonari had been
lessening. On June 20, Sedlnitzky could report to Metternich that the
secret society of Guelfi was established after Carbonari had become no
secret and thus were limited in their activities. Their purpose consisted
like that of Carbonari in the unity and independence of Italy, be it in
a republican or constitutional form. As for the membership of Guelfi,
however, only Carbonari with a higher degree and the Masons of the
Italian – French creations were allowed to enter this secret society.24
22 Ottavio Albicini, don Antonio Gridoglia and Antonio Masserini.
23 CHVOJKA, Zápas habsburskej polície, pp. 230–231.
24 HHStA, Staatskanzlei (thereafter StK), Noten von der Polizeihofstelle (thereafter
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The attempted insurgence of Carbonari in Macerata southerly of
Ancona and their expansion to Dalmatia and Lombardy posed once
again a question of a real Carbonari-threat within the Habsburg em-
pire. Sedlnitzky didn’t omit to reinforce quiet secret inquiries in this
respect, although the governor of Lombardy, Count Strassoldo, consid-
ered in August 1817 all the possible resonances to be avoided through
the timely Papal action. More importantly, Austrian police authorities
didn’t hesitate to employ arbitrarily looking means in order to main-
tain the peace and order in Italian provinces. For example, because
of being considered a “politically dangerous and corrupted person”,
Count Maghella, former General Police Director in Kingdom of Naples
and one of the closest collaborators of Joachim Murat, was imprisoned
in the Piedmont’s fortress Fenestrelle. Nevertheless, as a Sardinian citi-
zen he repeatedly asked his government to set him free, especially, after
the Habsburg police had failed to provide sufficiently discrediting ma-
terials against him and according to Sardinian government, “the accu-
sations were not so serious to deprive him of his freedom any longer”.25 Both
the Austrian chief of police Sedlnitzky and the general police director
in Milan, Count Saurau, insisted, however, on keeping him further un-
der lock and key for higher state purposes. They regarded him – to
some extent truly – as a “dangerous coryphaeus of an antihabsburg opposi-
tion”. No wonder that his release depended on the level of stabilization
in northern Italy, if one takes into account the expansion of Carbonari
movement there.26
Thus, in dealing with secret societies, the Austrian government ap-
plied a method of secret investigation and close control, aiming at no
“public” steps against the “sect leaders” or higher-ranked promoters of
Italian independence. In addition, it preferred a more precise pursuit
both of the Carbonari and of their attempts to set up new filial lodges
NvP), box 33, Sedlnitzky to Metternich, June 20, 1817.
25 HHStA, StK, Noten an die Polizeihofstelle (thereafter NaP), box 6, Folio 7, Metter-
nich to Sedlnitzky, July 5, 1817.
26 See CHVOJKA, Zápas habsburskej polície, pp. 232–234; CHVOJKA, Vigilandum
Est Semper, pp. 46–47.
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on the Austrian soil as well as to establish contacts with abroad. By
contrast, the Roman police did not hesitate to apply “inquisitorial” and
public measures against secret societies, as the Austrian ambassador in
Rome, Prince Kaunitz, suggested. Accordingly, the chief of Roman po-
lice, Monsignore Pacca, had planned to arrest all the Carbonari-leaders
in Italy on one day and to court-martial them. Consequently, he was
allegedly intending both to publish the verdict with motives and to
grant a full amnesty to all other fraternized, provided that they would
declare their aberrations ruefully within a month at the respective local
authority.27
The data about the activities of Carbonari, Guelfi and Adelfi28 ac-
quired by Prince Metternich at the Congress of Aachen (October 1818)
confirmed once more the importance of mutual collaboration of ultra-
conservative powers in the Apennine Peninsula. After the Carbonari-
lodge in the Venetian province Polesine had been discovered in January
1819, the repressive machine began its work in the Austrian “Italy”,
particularly by establishing the Special investigation commission
(Spezial-Untersuchungskommission) in Venice for the purpose of sup-
pressing the Carbonari-movement more effectively. Count Sedlnitzky,
pointing out that the Carbonari lodge in Polesine had been established
from Ferrara in the Papal State, simultaneously tried to induce the
chief of Roman police, Monsignore Pacca, to make both next and previ-
ously required information from Rome available to Vienna. Neverthe-
less, there was a stumbling block in Austro-Roman collaboration fed
by their different approaches and geopolitical situation. Habsburg po-
lice authorities criticized late information flow from Rome, “too” fast
27 HHStA, StK, NaP, box 7, Metternich to Sedlnitzky, October 8, 1817.
28 In the course of 1818, new information about Carbonari in Lombardy-Venetia
came into the police hands, pointing out Counts Aghutti, Archinto and Crivelli as
the chiefs of Lombardian independentists. In addition, the “sect” of the so-called
“Adelfi” was supposed to exist primarily in Piedmont and to be striving to exert
influence upon different Carbonari and Guelfi lodges. Another reports warned of
the contacts between Russian and Italian “sectarians” as well as of the emergence
of a new secret society called “Societa delfica”. See CHVOJKA, Vigilandum Est
Semper, p. 47.
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detentions of Carbonari by Roman police as well as its “useless” official
publication. Roman authorities, by contrast, disapproved of the tem-
porizing and tepid Austrian strategy and were anxious about the inter-
ference of Austria in Roman affairs.29 Such controversies had affected
the degree of police collaboration between Rome and Vienna on one
hand and the efficiency with respect to preventing Carbonari activities
on the other. It was the weakening vigilance of the Austrian police as
well as the assumption that secret societies would not be able to orga-
nize a revolution for independence successfully without receiving help
from abroad and thus believing the situation in Italy was under con-
trol,30 that had left Metternich and Sedlnitzky completely surprised by
the outbreak of the revolution in Naples in July 1820.
Between Carbonari-revolutions and Austrian Show Trials
The revolutionary outbreak in Naples in July 1820, as opposed to those
in Portugal and Spain four months earlier, alarmed the guardians of
Austrian order and security and provoked a set of rigorous counter-
revolutionary measures.31 First of all, there was a strict supervision of
29 The Papal State suspectedAustria because of alleged attempts to gain Papal north-
ern provinces (so-called legations) and thus to strengthen its position in the Apen-
nine peninsula. This hypothesis was false, but based on real Habsburg occupation
right in Papal fortresses Ferrara and Comacchio as a basis for intervention to the
Central and Southern Italy. As Paul W. Schroeder put it, Austria’s acquisition of
Lombardy-Venetia created a deeper problem for the international system. It vir-
tually forced Austria to lead and organize Italy, yet did not really empower her
to do so. Lombardy-Venetia was not big enough as a power base to give Austria
control of the whole peninsula, yet too big for the comfort of others (Piedmont,
Papal State). See SCHROEDER, p. 566; CHVOJKA, Zápas habsburskej polície,
pp. 236–237.
30 See CHVOJKA, Zápas habsburskej polície, pp. 239–240.
31 The following text is a short version of my article published in Italian language
(only) – see M. CHVOJKA, Tra nazionalismo e assolutismo. I Carbonari, pri-
gioneri politici di stato nello Spielberg, in: F. LEONCINI (ed.), L’Alba dell’Europa
Liberale. La trama internazionale delle cospirazioni risorgimentali, Minelliana 2012, pp.
31–47.
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borders and passengers travelling from Naples to Piedmont and Lom-
bardy. In late August 1820, the Emperor Francis I proclaimed rigor-
ous punishments against Carbonari in Milan and Venice, reminding
the Austrian subjects of death penalty for treason or life imprisonment
for collaboration.32
In the field of diplomacy, the eastern powers Russia, Prussia and
Austria negotiated the “Italian question” at the congresses in Trop-
pau (Opava) and Laibach (Ljubljana) at the turn of 1820/21.33 Con-
sequently, they resolved upon an antirevolutionary intervention prin-
ciple as well as its particular application in the Kingdom of both Si-
cilies. The Austro-Russian coalition army under the command of gen-
eral Frimont suppressed first the revolution in Naples. After another
Carbonari-revolt had broken out in Piedmont in March 1821, the in-
tervention was extended there as well in order to restore the status
quo. Particular leaders from revolutionary Naples were expelled and
supervised in Austria for “higher political purposes”, following the
example of French exiles (f. e. Joseph Fouché, Anne-Jean Savary) or
Napoleonids. Thus, Police Minister Borelli, Generals Pietro Coletta,
Pedrinelli and Arcovito as well as MP’s Poerio and Pepe found their
forced domicile within city borders of Prague, Graz and Brno. As late
as the congress of Verona had permitted them to choose the residence
of their own except for the Kingdom of both Sicilies.34
Prince Metternich developed also an intense diplomatic offensive
against Switzerland as a “meeting place of all exiled revolutionaries”.
He blamed the Alpine state for giving asylum to political proponents
32 See PESENDORFER, p. 162; CHVOJKA, Zápas habsburskej polície, pp. 240–241;
Seiner Majestät des Kaisers Franz Gesetze und Verfassungen im Justiz-Fache. Für die
Deutschen Staaten der Oesterreichischen Monarchie. Von dem Jahre 1798 bis 1803, Wien
1816, p. 327, §§ 52–55.
33 See for instance P.W. SCHROEDER, Metternich’s Diplomacy at Its Zenith, Austin
1962; J. POLIŠENSKÝ, Opavský kongres roku 1820 a evropská politika let 1820–1822,
Ostrava 1962.
34 See D. UHLÍRˇ, Brneˇnská internace úcˇastníku˚ Neapolské buržoasní revoluce
r. 1820, in: Brno v minulosti a dnes IV, Brno 1962, pp. 32–48; CHVOJKA, Sedlnitzky,
pp. 282–283.
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of constitutionalism and independence of Italy or Germany, what he
came to call “moral abuse” of the Swiss neutrality. His initiatives tem-
porarily succeeded, as the last congress of Pentarchy in Verona (Octo-
ber – December 1822) agreed to a Protocol affirming the expulsion of
political exiles from Switzerland. Moreover, Switzerland proclaimed
so-called “Alien- and Press Conclusum” in July 1823 – limiting free-
dom of the press – under the threat of possible armed intervention of
the “Eastern powers”.35
In Lombardy and Venetia, the Special investigation commission de-
veloped an intense activity meeting with a considerable success. Many
Carbonari leaders were arrested and interrogated whereas a series of
trials in Milan and Venice in early 1820’s demonstrated a climax of
Carbonari-repression. It is fair to mention especially both a “Vene-
tian group” around Felice Foresti and Constantino Munari (1821) and
“Lombardian groups” around Pietro Maroncelli and Silvio Pellico
(1821) as well as Federico Confalonieri and Giorgio Pallavicini (1823).
According to §§ 50–60 of the State Penal Code36 issued by the Em-
peror Francis II in September 1803 and valid from January 1804, Car-
bonari were generally alleged of treason because they had been pro-
moting the society striving to bring about the Austrian sovereignty
in Italy in a violent way, further disturbing the state order by writ-
ings, speeches, railroading the Austrian subjects against the Habsburg
administration as well as by omitting proper denunciation of antihabs-
burg movement. They were also accused of heavy police infringe-
ments, mostly because of their membership in secret societies (freema-
son lodges or Carbonari groups). As the Senate of Justice of Lombardy–
-Venetia reported in May 1821, Felice Foresti, for instance, was
convicted that he had worked for and belonged to the Carbonari after
the purpose of this association had already been known. He attended
the Vendita of Ferrara in November 1817, received and distributed
the Carbonari devices, writings and circulars of the Latin Senate. On
35 CHVOJKA, Zápas habsburskej polície, pp. 241–242.
36 See Kaisers Franz Gesetze, pp. 326–328.
57
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
West Bohemian Historical Review V j 2015 j 2
May 22, 1818, he attended the Carbonari midday meal, briefly, he went
on to belong to the Carbonari league faithfully, which he had entered
as a provisional Austrian judge and remained there even as a definitive
k. k. Praetor.37 Similarly, Antonio Villa was known as a loyal friend of
Foresti and proved to be extremely active in spreading of the “sect” in
1818 for the cause of the conspiracy. He was convicted of having en-
tered Carboneria with full knowledge of their criminal purpose. Fur-
thermore, he confessed to have heard from his Carbonari-fellows that
they should really act. Villa admitted to have won many of the con-
spirators for the “sect”.38
As a consequence of these and similar charges, the capital punish-
ment had been imposed on many of Carbonari. The Emperor Francis
I commuted it however, in all relevant cases to temporary or lifetime
imprisonment at Habsburg fortresses in Brno (Spielberg/Špilberk) or
Laibach. The underlying motive can be seen partly in humanity, but
most importantly in security policy considerations. By saying that “I
decided to overlook the death penalty also to the three most culpable (Solera,
Foresti and Munari – M.CH.) of convicts in question and to change it into
a 20-year prison sentence provided they would make more important discov-
eries – to be proven true yet – concerning several important Carbonari and
the Dignitaries of Milan in particular”,39 the Austrian monarch clearly
ordered to use imprisonment as an instrument of obtaining new data
about Carbonari-branching in Italy.
Obviously, the main goal of Carbonari repression was to securitize
the state order along with the general (deterrent effect of punishment)
37 HHStA, KA, Kabinettskanzleiakten (thereafter KKA), box 50, No. 705, Report of
Senate of Justice in Lombardy–Venetia from May 18, 1821.
38 Ibidem.
39 HHStA, KA, KKA, box 50, ad No. 705, concept of the highest resolution of Em-
peror Francis I to police chief Sedlnitzky (undated). This resolution is to be found
among documents with respect to a show trial with 47 Carbonari, thirteen of
which had been sentenced to death. Firstly, Francis I commuted only ten of them
to temporary imprisonment, while having added later also Felice Foresti, Con-
stantino Munari and Antonio Solera to them.
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and particular prevention (individual correction)40 of political instabil-
ity.
Incarceration of Carbonari at Spielberg under Francis I
During 1820s, there were 23 Italian Carbonari imprisoned at infamous
fortress Spielberg, four of which had died41 there. Most importantly,
we have to mention Silvio Pellico,42 Pietro Maroncelli, Antonio Solera,
Andrea Tonelli, Felice Foresti, Marco Fortini, Antonio Villa, Francesco
Arese, Giorgio Pallavicini, Pietro Borsieri, Gaetano Castillia, Federico
Confalonieri, Cesare Albertini, Luigi Manfredini, Constantino Munari
or Silvio Moretti. Between 1833–1835, further nineteen Italians had
been arrested there, mostly as a consequence of Austrian repression
against Young Italy movement.43
40 Regarding the general deterrence, punishment of the offender functions by exert-
ing influence on the public in general and by deterring others from committing
criminal acts like the former. According to the specific deterrence, the punish-
ment is having an effect on perpetrators themselves and works to educate and
improve them, or at least protects society from them. See H. ORTNER, Gefängnis.
Eine Einführung in seine Innenwelt, Basel 1988, p. 46.
41 For example, Fortunati Oroboni died in 1823, Antonio Villa in 1827 or Silvio
Moretti in 1832.
42 Silvio Pellico spent more than 10 years in one of the harshest Habsburg fortresses.
His memoirs (in this article, I am referring to “Memoirs of Silvio Pellico or My
Prisons, New York 1844”), however, were written in a quite moderate way, but
simultaneously providing the reader with a detailed description of the cruel liv-
ing conditions there. Metternich is notorious for his expression that this book had
harmed Austria more than a lost battle. See H. von SRBIK,Metternich. Der Staats-
mann und der Mensch, München 1925, Vol. 1, p. 490. However, it is important to
note that Pellico is not absolutely objective in his otherwise very valuable account.
For instance, he doesn’t mention the organization of Carbonari, its objectives and
activities as well as his role there in particular, but makes only some general re-
marks in this respect. Consequently, he appears to be completely innocent and the
way of his imprisonment unjust and extraordinary harsh in his book (chapters 57,
61, 71–72, 85), which is not true, for he was trialled legitimately and according to
particular paragraphs of the Austrian penal code from 1803.
43 See O. FRANEˇK – O. TOMAN, Špilberk, Brno 1968, pp. 85–91; L. CONTEGIA-
COMO, Spielberg. Documentazione sui detenuti politici Italiani. Inventario 1822–1859,
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Spielberg represented a closed penal institution which was consid-
ered to be one of the harshest fortress prisons in the Habsburg monar-
chy, most importantly due to unbearable sanitary and climatic living
conditions. If a prisoner convicted of treason had been allowed to
move from Spielberg to castle of Laibach in order to pass the rest of
his punishment there under the same conditions, it was still seen as a
moderation of the sentence.44 No wonder that the change of climate
represented a substantial alleviation of living conditions provided that
Carbonari had to be confined in fetters in solitary and double cells45
with restricted and predetermined food portions.46
There was an internal differentiation of inmates according to the
type of crime and sex at Spielberg. At the end of May 1823, there
were 266 male and 58 female prisoners, guided totally by 79 super-
visory guards.47 Carbonari – as political prisoners – were separated
from the other inmates of Spielberg fortress.48 The chief of Austrian
Rovigo 2010.
44 For example, Giorgio Pallavicini asked to be transferred to a location with more
clement climate repeatedly. The same asked Giorgio di Castiglia for his son
Gaetano imprisoned at Spielberg. See Moravský zemský archiv Brno (thereafter
MZA), Moravsko slezské gubernium – prezidium (thereafter MSGP), box 953, No.
515/G ex 1832, f. 5 verso, protocol with Pallavicini made by police director Peter
von Muth, April 10, 1832 and box 955, No. 587/G ex 1834, Sedlnitzky to Inzaghy,
June 13, 1834.
45 See MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 403/G ex 1825, fol. 2, cells allocated to Carbonari,
June 13, 1825.
46 See MZA, Policejní rˇeditelství (thereafter PRˇ), box 70, folio 422, Instruction draft
for Spielberg supervisor in chief with respect to Italian Carbonari, §§ 29–33 and
MSGP, box 947, No. 170/G ex 1825, ff. 21–25, Mittrowsky to His Majesty (Emperor
Francis I), December 21, 1824.
47 SeeMZA,MSGP, box 947, statement on status and numbers of inmates and guards
at Spielberg from May 29, 1823. For a complete register of names of guards see
MZA, PRˇ, box 4, ff. 20–30.
48 MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 403/G ex 1825, f. 2, cell allocating to Carbonari, June
13, 1825; box 948, No. 418/G and 480/G ex 1826 (arrival of next four (Brescianese)
Carbonari from Laibach); See also box 950, No. 85/G ex 1828 (cells allocated
to Carbonari) or box 953, No. 246/G ex 1833 (eventual imprisonment of new
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police, Count Sedlnitzky, indicated both safety and “higher” state po-
lice considerations in this regard. First of all, Carbonari were to be
prevented from any possible escape attempt49 by keeping an appropri-
ate close watch over them, which was harder to achieve in isolation
and separation. More importantly, however, it was necessary to induce
the imprisoned Carbonari to reveal “complete data” about “machina-
tions” of secret societies in Italy and to “fill some gaps” in their pro-
tocolar assertions. Their isolation was thus supposed to provoke a
more intense secret communication between them and their families or
supporters, possibly providing a desired information source for Aus-
trian police. Both the governor of Moravia and Silesia Count Anton
Friedrich Mittrowsky as a supreme authority in terms of Carbonari
surveillance at Spielberg and Brno police director Peter v. Muth as a
direct subordinate of Count Sedlnitzky were asked to send a relevant
report at least every six months for these explicit reasons.50 Not sur-
prisingly, Muth was obliged by Sedlnitzky in a “strictly confidential
way” both to scrutinize the governor’s actions concerning Carbonari
inconspicuously and without being suspected and to report whether
and how Mittrowsky had been implementing imperial orders.51 Fur-
thermore, the Austrian police and political authorities in Vienna re-
quired regular reports about morality, discipline and health status of
Carbonari.52 Apparently, control and treatment of Carbonari was being
traitors).
49 These considerations were fully justified, for there were not only organized at-
tempts to escape from Spielberg in 1820 and 1822 (MZA, PRˇ, box 70, ff. 9–12,
Muth to Sedlnitzky, October 7, 1820; MSGP, box 947, No. 503/g ex 1822, Smerczek
to governorate, December 5, 1822), but also to assassinate the Spielberg supervisor
in-chief Smerczek in April 1826 (see MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 227/g, Governer’s
decree to Sedlnitzky, April 25, 1826).
50 MZA, PRˇ, box 2, Sedlnitzky to Mittrowsky, January 22, 1822 and Sedlnitzky to
Muth, January 31, 1822.
51 MZA, PRˇ, box 4, f. 7, Sedlnitzky to Muth, June 20, 1825.
52 MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 310/G ex 1825, folio 1, Sedlnitzky to Mittrowsky, May
25, 1825 and No. 592/G ex 1825, f. 1, Emperor Francis I to Mittrowsky, November
27, 1825.
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run simultaneously according to general laws,53 particular surveillance
instructions,54 house rules and both specific imperial and state police
directives, examples of which we have mentioned above.
The arrested Carbonari were forbidden to correspond55 with any-
body including their families. Moreover, they should not come into
contact with other criminals arrested at Spielberg as well as with any-
body not officially entrusted with guarding or treating them due to
imperial order fromMid-November 1825.56 As a result, they were con-
fined to “socialize” only with their cell mate and police director Muth.
The priest, physicians and guards had to limit the conversation “to un-
avoidable necessities”. Moreover, Carbonari were to be prevented from
communicating by knocking on the cell walls or discussing through
windows.57 Spielberg supervisor in-chief, Moritz Smerczek, was
obliged to report daily about surveillance of Carbonari to governor
Mittrowsky while three most reliable watchmen58 – Joseph Schiller,
Ernest Kral and Vinzenz Kupitzky – had to guard them.
53 See Kaisers Franz Gesetze, pp. 320–322 (§§ 11–24).
54 Police director instructed the Spielberg supervisor in-chief in detail (§ 60) in terms
of imprisonment, cell furnishing and cleaning, clothing, occupation, spiritual ed-
ucation, nourishment, medical care and surveillance of Carbonari. See MZA, PRˇ,
box 70, ff. 418–422, Instruction draft for Spielberg supervisor in chief with respect
to Italian Carbonari; MSGP, box 947, No. 310/G ex 1825, f. 1, Sedlnitzky to Mit-
trowsky, May 25, 1825.
55 Relatives of Carbonari could get messages about their health status only via gov-
ernor of Moravia-Silesia. Otherwise, they were reminded of the fact that accord-
ing to § 13 of the Austrian Penal Code, it was forbidden to supply Carbonari with
messages from outside, be it from relatives or other persons. See Kaisers Franz
Gesetze, p. 320 (§ 13); MZA, MSGP, box 950, No. 473/g ex 1827; box 951, No. 72/g
ex 1829, Sedlnitzky to Inzaghy, January 24, 1829.
56 MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 570/G ex 1825, f. 1, Emperor Francis I to Mittrowsky,
Pressburg, November 13, 1825.
57 See MZA, PRˇ, box 70, f. 422, Instruction draft for Spielberg supervisor in chief
with respect to Italian Carbonari, §§ 44–45, 48, 51, 57–58.
58 See MZA, MSGP, box 947, ff. 10 and 12, Mittrowsky to Emperor Francis I, Decem-
ber 21, 1824.
62
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
M. Chvojka, “Whose realm, his law”. The Austrian Repression. . . , pp. 43–74
Medical Care, Spiritual Control and Question of Work
at Spielberg
As far as medical care at Spielberg was considered, both the “house
physician” Dr. Joseph Bayer and surgeon Linhard were visiting Spiel-
berg regularly three times a week. In specific cases and for not every
physician had been allowed to gain access to Carbonari, the substituted
medical assistant Dr. Steiner von Pfungen was brought in.59 Carbonari
could not correspond with their families, but the latter were supposed
to get trimestrial messages about state of health of their imprisoned
relatives.60 Carbonari were to be healed in their cells, while taking pre-
scribed and necessary (i. e. no redundant) medicaments only. In curing
their illnesses,61 physicians were entitled to ask for alleviations like re-
moving of chains62 or ensuring better food or clothes.63
59 MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 170/g ex 1825, ff. 13–14, Mittrowsky to His Majesty,
December 21, 1824.
60 See MZA, MSGP, box 949, No. 146/G ex 1827, medical reports of all Italian Car-
bonari at Spielberg from March and August 1827; box 950, No. 182/G ex 1828,
medical reports from May 1828; box 951, No. 374/G ex 1829, medical reports
from August 1829; box 952, No. 52/G ex 1830, medical reports from February
1830 etc.
61 Carbonari sufferred for example from flatulence, indigestion, blood flow, haem-
orrhoids, angina pectoris, gout or even lymphatic tumour, as a result of which
Pietro Maroncelli’s left leg had to be amputated in June 1828. See medical reports
mentioned in the footnote above and for Maroncelli see MZA, MSGP, box 950,
No. 100/G and 182/G ex 1828; box 951, No. 347/G ex 1828, f. 2 verso, Inzaghy to
Francis I, July 2, 1828 and No. 515/G ex 1828, (artificial limb for Maroncelli); PRˇ,
box 4, f. 12, Sedlnitzky to Muth, July 8, 1828.
62 The visitation of police director Muth had revealed in February 1827 that more
Italian prisoners at Spielberg were fastened partly with one chain only, partly
without chains and partly only with handcuffs. Consequently, the authorities in
Vienna required to know the reasons for such alleviations. See MZA, MSGP, box
949, No. 169/G ex 1827, Sedlnitzky to temporary governor of Moravia-Silesia,
Count Klebelsberg, March 29, 1827.
63 MZA Brno, PRˇ, box 70, f. 421, Instruction draft for a Spielberg supervisor in chief
with respect to Italian Carbonari, §§ 34–41. See also MZA, MSGP, box 949, No.
434/G ex 1827, Imperial resolution about food for Pellico; box 950, No. 496/G
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Walking and “making use of fresh air” also proved to be very im-
portant measure in terms of health protection of Carbonari, especially
if they had been imprisoned in casemate wall of Spielberg without di-
rect access of sunlight and outside world. Silvio Pellico describes it in
his memoirs as follows: “It had been established from the first that each of us
should have an hour to walk, twice a week. Afterwards this relief was granted
every other day, and still later, every day, except festivals. Each one was taken
to walk separately, between two guards, with muskets on their shoulders.”64
The governor Mittrowsky as a provincial head of Carbonari surveil-
lance was compelled to provide them with such a possibility by im-
perial instructions from December 4, 1824.65 Consequently, they used
the so-called “small terrace” for this purpose, walking two by two66
there according their cell allocation, for the bigger terrace on the other
Spielberg side did not conform to required security regards.67 Its small
size was not the only negative, however, because a smoke was said to
condense there in windy weather. Therefore, the chimneys at Spielberg
and 549/G ex 1827, better food for Pellico, Pallavicini, Solera and Tonelli. In case
of disease, prisoners were given double size of their usual portion. For instance,
12 of 13 examined Carbonari were issued with these double portions in December
1829 (MZA, MSGP, box 952, No. 523/G ex 1829, report of Spielberg supervisor
in-chief, Aloys Dickmann, from December 17, 1829) or 9 of 9 Carbonari in April
1832 (MZA, MSGP, box 953, No. 561/G ex 1832, report of Spielberg supervisor
in-chief, Aloys Dickmann, from April 26, 1832).
64 See Memoirs of Silvio Pellico, p. 65 (chapter LXV).
65 MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 170/g ex 1825, folio 1, Mittrowsky to His Majesty,
December 21, 1824.
66 See MZA, MSGP, box 950, No. 43/G ex 1828, Smerczek to governorate’s presid-
ium, January 29, 1828.
67 Firstly, one could dare to jump from the bigger terrace in order to escape through
the forest. Secondly and lastly, it was possible to communicate both with external
world by means of signs and with the wife, relatives and servants of Spielberg
supervisor in-chief, because the windows of his flat were situated towards the
bigger terrace. See MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 170/g ex 1825, ff. 3–4, Mittrowsky
to His Majesty, December 21, 1824.
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were to be extended in spring 1825.68 Since January 1828, Carbonari
were allowed to spend two hours a day walking on the terrace.69
Despite the fact that the overall aim of Carbonari’s imprisonment
was to repress, isolate and marginalize them, there were also strong
pastoral objectives in order to promote their reintegration after release.
Being deprived of possibility to write and read in general, Carbonari
were allowed to read Bible and religious books70 like “La religione
vincitrice” by Antonio Valsecchi,71 “Le confessioni” by St. Augustin
or “Vita e Dottrina di Gesú Christo” by Federico Leopoldo di Stol-
berg.72 The Emperor Francis I placed great emphasis also on spiritual
and pastoral assistance for imprisoned Italians and ordered them to
take part in holy messes on Sundays and bank holidays. It was not
easy to implement this resolution, however, for there were only two
priests at Spielberg for both male and female prisoners so that Car-
bonari were escorted to “house church”73 only on occasion of major
feasts. This was the case, especially if they were to be isolated not
only from other criminals at Spielberg, but even among themselves
by distinguishing a “Lombard” and “Venetian” group.74 Later on, a
particular post of a chaplain for Carbonari had been established and
priest Stephan Paulovich was sent to Spielberg directly from Vienna,
where he had served as a court chaplain, in order to provide church
and confession service for them in Italian language at least every three
68 Ibidem, ff. 2–4.
69 See MZA, MSGP, box 950, No. 43/G ex 1828, Smerczek to governorate’s presid-
ium, January 29, 1828.
70 MZA, MSGP, box 949, No. 54/g ex 1827, Saurau to Mittrowsky, January 9, 1827.
71 MZA, MSGP, box 950, No. 604/g ex 1828, Saurau to Inzaghy, November 20, 1827.
72 MZA, MSGP, box 953, No. 1369/g ex 1832, Sedlnitzky to Inzaghy, September 12,
1832.
73 Carbonari were to be separated from each other during holy masses as well. See
MZA, MSGP, box 950, No. 35/g ex 1828, statement of Spielberg supervisor in-
chief Smerczek about division of Carbonari during the holy mass from January
21, 1828.
74 MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 170/g ex 1825, ff. 1 and 14–16, Mittrowsky to His
Majesty, December 21, 1824.
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months.75 This was only the first and preliminary step until “a reliable
priest, devoted to government, zealous in catholic education and speaking per-
fect Italian”76 would be found and hired for this purpose in Moravian
capital itself.
While authorities in Brno were looking for a suitable candidate in
the second half of March 1825, imperial instructions77 from Vienna de-
termined main goals as well as scope of employment for priest Paulo-
vich.78 The first one of them is particularly interesting for us because it
concerned the spiritual and pastoral assistance (control) of Carbonari
and its relations to “arrest policy” (Arrestpolizey), pastoring itself as
well as to what was termed as a “beneficial” part. By referring to
“Arrestpolizey”, the priest was reminded not to behave in away, which
could change or alleviate the punishment itself, especially with respect
to preserving order and security at Spielberg. Thus, he was forbidden
to assess the verdict or to deliver presents or messages of all kinds from
and to imprisoned Carbonari.79 As far as pastoring was concerned,
the pastor had to confine himself to confession for the purpose of in-
vestigating the psychic state of Carbonari and to eschew any insights
into record of proceedings. Further, he ought to make them realize
damnability, culpability and severity of their crimes, to correct their re-
ligious principles if necessary and to evoke remorse and repentance in
them. At the same time, the priest was expected to induce Carbonari
75 See MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 145/G ex 1825, f. 1, Saurau to Mittrowsky, March
10, 1825; FRANEˇK – TOMAN, p. 82.
76 MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 145/G ex 1825, f. 1, Saurau to Mittrowsky, March 10,
1825.
77 See MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 194/G ex 1825, “Instruction for a pastor to be sent
to the Italian prisoners in the castle hill of Brno” and “Directive for a religious
teacher of the arrested criminal persons”.
78 MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 194/G ex 1825, f. 1, Saurau to Mittrowsky, Vienna,
March 29, 1825 along with a transcript of imperial order of Francis I from March
28, 1825 (f. 3).
79 See MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 194/G ex 1825, “Instruction for a pastor to be sent
to the Italian prisoners in the castle hill of Brno”.
66
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
M. Chvojka, “Whose realm, his law”. The Austrian Repression. . . , pp. 43–74
to bear their punishment patiently.80 In the final “beneficial” regard,
there were instructions in case that the imprisoned Italians would re-
veal some new data – as a sort of making amends for commited crimes
– about both persons involved in Carboneria and means promoting
goals of this association. In the beginning, it does not seem as a supe-
rior hierarchical claim to break the seal of confession, for it depended
on the priest to decide to what extent the arrest policy, state security
or an upcoming crime had been concerned. However, the latter was
obliged to report on these issues immediately either to governor (ar-
rest policy) or to Emperor (state security, upcoming crime),81 so that the
existing regime was to benefit from this spiritual service. The directive
for a religious teacher of arrested criminals bore itself in a similar spirit
delimited between arrest policy, non-interference with authority and
moral betterment of prisoners.82
Having seen religious assistance for Carbonari ordered, the impe-
rial order renewed the claim to get regular priest’s reports on Car-
bonari’s piety and their frame of mind as well as on their degree of
improvement.83 Thus, we can lay our hands on interesting psycho-
logical analysis concerning all Italian Carbonari at Spielberg and serv-
ing as a spiritual barometer of Habsburg prison’s system and hard-
ships of its repression. No wonder that most of Carbonari showed
signs of remorse, including Silvio Pellico, Pietro Maroncelli, Andrea
Tonelli, Constantino Munari or Federico Confalonieri.84 Such system
80 Ibidem.
81 Ibidem.
82 See MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 194/G ex 1825, “Directive for a religious teacher of
the arrested criminal persons” (§ 16).
83 MZA,MSGP, box 951, No. 55/G, Sedlnitzky to Inzaghy, January 26, 1829; box 952,
No. 87/G, Sedlnitzky to Inzaghy, February 24, 1830.
84 Silvio Pellico, for instance, was characterized by priest Vinzenz Žiak in Febru-
ary 1829 as a quiet, almost always sad and sickly man, explaining his offence –
like Pietro Maroncelli – by reading “detrimental” books and contacts with “evil-
minded’ people. He was aware of his guilt, considered punishment as a righteous
act of God’s providence and showed a great respect for every authority. To the
contrary and as an exception, Silvio Moretti went on to claim to be innocent but
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resembles Quaker penitentiaries in Pennsylvania in late 18th century,
viewing offenders as those who had abandoned God and therefore
should be guided back to Him. According to a proverb “a fault con-
fessed is half redressed”, bible reading and the question of atonement
were seen as an inherent part of punishment.85
Work assignment supposed to be one of central issues of the penal
system, though not for the sake of cost-effective utilization, but as a fur-
ther “distraction” and prevention of malicious and pernicious effects
of “idleness”. As in the case of Carbonari’s walks, however, particular
imperial directives were coming into collision with general ones with
respect to their scrutiny. Accordingly, Carbonari should be assigned
an appropriate work to be done two by two or collectively in a bigger
room, but, of course, in isolation from the other inmates at Spielberg.86
For this last purpose, they had not been sentenced to carry out pub-
lic work. Consequently, governor Mittrowsky considered it impossi-
ble to realize such instructions, especially in terms of perpetual over-
crowding of the penitentiary and increasing number of expenses and
supervisory staff.87 Indicating complications connected with activities
like gardening or carpentry, Mittrowsky suggested reading of belletris-
tic, ancient or scientific books except for diplomacy and politics to be
permitted for Carbonari as an appropriate “work” and sign of impe-
rial mercy.88 Such a measure had not been adopted though, because
the general policy pursued a contradictory course.89 The imprisoned
on the other hand, he liked visiting religious lessons. See MZA, MSGP, box 951,
No. 80/G, Vinzenz Žiak’s comment on Carbonari, February 8, 1829.
85 See ORTNER, pp. 24–25.
86 MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 170/G ex 1825, ff. 8–9, Mittrowsky to His Majesty
(Emperor Francis I), December 21, 1824.
87 Mittrowsky pointed out, it would be necessary to employ 9 instead of current
three watchmen in order to supervise Carbonari during work in their cells. One
had to bring in either next Spielberg inmates or salaried craftsmen as well in order
to instruct Carbonari in new activity. Ibidem, ff. 9–12.
88 Ibidem, ff. 9–13.
89 In January 1826, Emperor Francis I ordered to send all books and personal be-
longings of Carbonari to Vienna, excluding clothes in which they arrived at Spiel-
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Italians had to get by with activities like wool spinning or socks and
hosiery knitting by means of wooden needles.90 Thus, chronic back-
wardness and ineptness of the penitentiary structure91 as well as re-
quirements of maintaining security and preventing disorder proved to
be considerable limiting factors of the “ordinary” and desired confine-
ment and treatment of Carbonari. These considerations might also lead
the new Emperor Ferdinand I as well as judicial and police authorities
in Vienna to offer Carbonari at Spielberg an option of being deported
to America in 1835.92
Structural-functional Perspectives and Conclusions
As Gresham M. Sykes has suggested, applying a structural-functional
approach to the prison as a microcosmos or small-scale society
berg. Consequently, Carbonari were allowed to read a spiritual literature only
(like Divozioni ovvero Esercizi sacri; Introduzione alla vita divota, composta da
S.Francesco di Sales or Dei fondamenti delle religione by Antonio Valsecchi). See
MZA, MSGP, box 948, No. 83/G ex 1826, Sedlnitzky to Mittrowsky, February 10,
1826 (including list of books brought by imprisoned Carbonari – Silvio Pellico and
Pietro Maroncelli alone possessed more than 70 various works in 154 volumes, in-
cluding Petrarca, Baretti, Homer, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Corneille, Racine or Mol-
liere) and No. 477/G ex 1826, Muth to Mittrowsky, August 2, 1826 (including a
list of permitted devotional books for Carbonari made by Smerczek on July 31,
1826).
90 MZA, MSGP, box 947, No. 170/G ex 1825, f. 11, Mittrowsky to His Majesty (Em-
peror Francis I), December 21, 1824; box 949, No. 426/g, f. 1 verso, Governor’s
decree to Sedlnitzky, August 13, 1827; box 950, No. 506/G ex 1827; box 951, No.
377/G ex 1828; No. 73/G and 93/G ex 1829 or box 952, No. 105/G ex 1830.
91 For attempts to overcome these problems by introducing penal colonies see G.N.
MODONA, Das historische Gleichnis der Strafkolonien, in: M. da PASSANO
(ed.), Europäische Strafkolonien im 19. Jahrhundert, Berlin 2006, pp. 1–6.
92 Pietro Borsieri, Giovanni Albinola, Felice Foresti, Gaetano Castiglia, Argenti as
well as Federico Confalonieri accepted it and were to be transported first to
Gradisca and from there to America. See MZA, MSGP, box 956, No. 876/G ex
1835, Sedlnitzky to Ugarte, December 7, 1835; No. 910/G ex 1835, Sedlnitzky to
Ugarte, December 22, 1835 and No. 98/G ex 1836, Sedlnitzky to Ugarte, February
11, 1836.
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specified questions about the problems of continuity and order, espe-
cially by seeing the prison’s objectives, social and physical environ-
ment, perceptions and social roles of guards and inmates etc. as in-
terrelated elements. Accordingly and in spite of limiting particular
conditions, prison offers the possibility of greater insights on the na-
ture of state’s system of control.93
Without getting too involved with complicated Parsonian theory of
social system94 here because of space absence, I consider Sykes’s sim-
plified set of basic insights95 fully applicable to and useful for general-
izing of Carbonari’s imprisonment at Spielberg for following reasons.
First and foremost, norms – of both guards and inmates – can be seen
as a function of social structure and thus as shaped by the system of
power and hierarchical surveillance in which they played out their so-
cial roles.96 We have seen the system of a “double” or checked control
with a governor to be scrutinized by police director, Spielberg supervi-
sor in-chief by his subordinate second supervisor or a priest whose in-
structions concerned both religious and political purposes. In addition,
there was a coexistence of general and particular directives contradict-
ing themselves to a certain degree,97 referring to a multiple respects (of
authority, legality, justice, humanity, christianity etc.) to be taken into
account.
We cannot but agree with a statement that imprisonment involved
a set of deprivations that went far beyond the loss of liberty or material
comfort. For instance, there was a number of psychological threats to
the self-conception or sense of worth,98 Italian prisoners had to face.
Various statements on Carbonari’s medical status and frame of mind
93 G.M. SYKES, The Structural-Functional Perspective on Imprisonment, in: T.
BLOMBERG (ed.), Punishment and Social Control, New York 1995, p. 80.
94 See T. PARSONS, The Social System, London u. a. 1991.
95 See SYKES, pp. 78–83.
96 Ibidem, p. 80.
97 For instance concerningmedical care, church service, walking or work assignment
of Carbonari.
98 See SYKES, p. 82.
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reveal it entirely, be it because of isolation, length of imprisonment or
after having seen their inmates to be released prematurely while be-
ing excluded from such a mercy.99 As a concequence, much of the be-
haviour of inmates could be understood as conscious or unconscious
attempts to meet and counter the problems posed by the deprivations
of prison life.100 Be it by illegal communications, repeated clemency
appeals,101 expressed desires102 and complaints, loyal and submissive
behaviour or even declarations to His Majesty.
Moreover, a certain degree of “cooperation” between inmates and
guards can be noticed for the sake of a “quiet institution”, especially
in exchange for illegal or forbidden rewards such as guards ignoring
the infraction of prison rules by Carbonari.103 Silvio Pellico mentioned
it in his Memoirs104 and we can confirm such a phenomenon at least
until spring 1826 as police director Muth discovered a series of defi-
ciencies in scrutinizing Carbonari. However, simple casualness and
99 See MZA, MSGP, box 953, No. 1224/g ex 1832, ff. 1–2, Muth to Inzaghy, Au-
gust 23, 1832.
100 See SYKES, p. 82.
101 MZA, PRˇ, box 4, f. 17, Sedlnitzky to Muth, July 18, 1828 (Villa, examination in
memoriam); MSGP, box 954, No. 237/G ex 1834, Governor’s decree to Sedlnitzky,
March 19, 1834 (clemency appeal of Borsieri, Confalonieri, Castiglia); box 955, No.
587/G ex 1834, Sedlnitzky to Inzaghy, June 13, 1834 (rejection for Castiglia). In
following cases, Carbonari had been released from prison – MZA, MSGP, box 952,
No. 346/G ex 1830, Sedlnitzky to Inzaghy, July 27, 1830 (remission of punishment
for Maroncelli, Pellico and Tonelli); box 953, No. 334/G ex 1832 (remission of
punishment for Alexandre Andryane); PRˇ, box 71, f. 49, governor Ugarte toMuth,
March 24, 1835 (remission of punishment for Munari and Bacchiega).
102 Except for usual desires of Carbonari to get better food or clothes, new books or
opportunity to correspond with relatives, there were also specific wishes, like An-
tonio Villa desiring a wig of Federico Confalonieri requesting a lathe. See MZA,
MSGP, box 947, No. 730/g, f. 9 verso, Mittrowsky to Francis I, December 21, 1824;
box 948, No. 418/G ex 1826, f. 4, Mittrowsky to Francis I, May 19, 1826; box 949,
No. 161/G ex 1827; box 950, No. 470/G ex 1827 or box 952, No. 589/G ex 1830.
103 See SYKES, p. 81.
104 See Memoirs of Silvio Pellico, p. 65 (chapter LXIV – food offers for Pellico by
Schiller), p. 70 (chapter LXXI – conversations with Schiller) or p. 78 (chapter
LXXIX – sleeping of guards).
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service neglect105 might come into consideration as well, though to a
limited degree, for only themost reliable106 guards were entrusted with
supervising Carbonari.
There is also a claim that behavior patterns of inmates sprang from
values, attitudes and beliefs finding expression in the so-called “inmate
code”. That implies a search for a theoretical and empirical variable to
find out the extent of inmate’s conformity to such a “code”. I tend
to agree with Gresham M. Sykes that it demonstrated more an ideal
than a description of how inmates behaved,107 especially if we take
into account a special treatment of Carbonari at Spielberg, their general
isolation from other inmates and subdivisions among themselves as
well.
Well, let me come to my conclusions. The clash between ultracon-
servative monarchical order and nationalist emancipation movement
of various Carbonari groups demonstrates a classical example, when
security of the state had opposed and actually was forced to oppress
the liberty of its people (nations) for the sake of (inter-)national peace
and order. However, there were first clear indications that the seem-
ingly insurmountable ideological dichotomy of these political actors,
which had not been channeled by gradual change of the political sys-
tem in Austria, could only be overcome by the revolution, i. e. by an
instrument tracing back its legitimacy to French, American or even
English revolutions. Following this point we can suggest a paradox-
like thesis, that preserving peace and order in general does not always
mean the absence of violence and of revolutions in particular.
105 Except deficiencies discovered by police director Muth in spring 1826, there was
also one even more fatal offence in September 1824, as watchman Urban aban-
doned his post in front of Carbonari prisons and had been discovered in a pub,
addicted to drinking. Urban was kept in prison for 68 hours and afterwards
25 days in solitary house arrest and four months in usual house arrest. See MZA,
MSGP, box 947, No. 152/G ex 1826, ff. 1–4, Smerczek to governorate’s presidium,
March 10, 1826.
106 For guards imposing silence or enforcing regulations see Memoirs of Silvio Pellico,
p. 63 (chapter LXIII), p. 65 (chapter LXIV) or p. 68 (chapter LXVIII).
107 See SYKES, p. 82.
72
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
M. Chvojka, “Whose realm, his law”. The Austrian Repression. . . , pp. 43–74
The very fact that the revolutions of 1820s in Italy and partially in
Greece – as opposed to those in France, Spain and Portugal – had been
activated and run by secret societies, proved to be the main factor in
increasing and intensifying the repressive and preventive (censorship,
travel restrictions etc.) police measures in the Habsburg Empire. From
then on, the fight against real or imagined secret societies had become
the principal task of Austrian police, occupying its authorities until the
end of Pre-March period in 1848.
Despite of severe punishments against Italian Carbonari, the trials
had not been run completely arbitrarily and the treatment of the pris-
oners of the state complied to some extent with the general regards
of Christianity and humanity, especially if compared to brutal deten-
tions and torturing under totalitarian and authoritarian regimes of the
20th century. Nevertheless, the close confinement in the fortress for
political reasons reminds us of the exceeding value which basic hu-
man rights/liberties associated with civil or political activity demon-
strate for us today. Finally, the lasting contribution of national move-
ments towards democratization and juridification of society cannot be
denied. Nevertheless, to paraphrase Quentin Skinner from the Cam-
bridge School of the history of political ideas, the current developments
(especially after 9/11) are making us aware even in 21st century that the
dangers of insecurity might prevail over freedom and liberty regard-
less of the type of political system.108
Abstract
This study deals with the Italian question in the Habsburg Monarchy between 1815
and 1835 in terms of the Austrian political and police sources. In the introduction,
the author points out the shortcomings of the newly acquired Austrian Italian territo-
ries Lombardy and Venetia as well as the measures seeking to suppress nationalism,
constitutionalism and jacobinism there. Since the Austrian authorities had not con-
sidered the incorporation process by far as concluded, the nature of the documents
108 Public evening lecture entitled “Liberty and Security. The Early Modern De-
bate”, delivered at the conference “Sicherheit in der Frühen Neuzeit” (Philipps-
University at Marburg, Germany) on September 15, 2011.
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mentioned above follow the line of strict surveillance and threat identification, inves-
tigation, arrest and repression. In the last section, the attention is being paid to var-
ious questions concerning the incarceration of Carbonari at the notorious Moravian
prison fortress Spielberg, e. g., the way of their treatment, medical care or spiritual
control.
Keywords
Absolutism; Nationalism; Carbonari; Surveillance
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